I. Introduction
The Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (hereafter called the Bangkok Treaty) was signed in Bangkok on 15 December 1995 by 10 countries of Southeast Asia: Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Brunei, the Philippines, Vietnam, Burma (Myanmar), Laos, and Cambodia. At the time of signing, the first seven of these were already members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), while Burma and Laos joined the grouping in 1997. While Cambodia's membership in ASEAN was postponed in July 1997 due to its internal problems, on 28 March 1997, it had become the seventh signatory country to deposit the instrument of ratification. This marked the Treaty's entry into force. 1 The Bangkok Treaty is a major initiative of ASEAN in its search for a new regional order in Southeast Asia. Two features of the Treaty set it apart from other efforts at creating nuclear weapon-free zones. It is the first such Treaty to include the land territory, territorial sea, the 200-mile exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of each signatory state. Secondly, the Treaty is the first effort at creating a nuclear weapon-free zone which asks the nuclear powers to refrain from using and threatening to use nuclear arms not only against parties to the Treaty, but also anywhere within the zone.
II. Background
The idea of a nuclear weapon-free zone in Southeast Asia was first mooted in the early 1970s when ASEAN (then comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines) was considering the proposal for establishing a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in Southeast Asia.
2 ZOPFAN was aimed at limiting the scope for great power intervention in Southeast Asia by calling upon them to refrain from forging alliances with Southeast Asian countries, establishing military bases in their territories, and interfering in their domestic affairs. At that time, ASEAN took note of nuclear weapon-free zone initiatives elsewhere, particularly the Treaty of Tlatelolco (for creating a nuclear weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean) and proposals for an African nuclear weapon-free zone, thereby indicating a desire to establish a similar zone as part of the ZOPFAN framework. Strategic and International Studies, 1987) .
But the ZOPFAN initiative was suspended by ASEAN following the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1979. The perceived threat from Vietnam pushed ASEAN into seeking strategic support from the US and China. Its focus shifted to isolating Vietnam and searching for a negotiated settlement of the Cambodia conflict. At the same time, the idea of a nuclear free zone was seen by ASEAN as an interim measure which could be advanced as a prelude to the realisation of ZOPFAN. In 1984, the Foreign Ministers of the ASEAN countries meeting in Jakarta considered the prospects for a nuclear weapon-free zone treaty in Southeast Asia. Two years later, the ministers asked a committee of officials working on ZOPFAN to study the principles, objectives and elements of a nuclear weapon-free zone and begin preliminary work on drafting a treaty.
At this point, the proposed treaty ran into serious objections from the US. The US pointed out that because the proposed zone was unlikely to be accepted by Vietnam (in view of the ASEAN-Vietnam rivalry), it could not constrain the ability of Vietnam's principal ally, the Soviet Union, from stationing nuclear forces in Vietnam. Consequently, a nuclear weapon-free zone in Southeast Asia would undermine the US nuclear deterrence posture without imposing similar constraints on the Soviet Union. Because of the strong US attitude, three of the region's most pro-Western countries, Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore, were reluctant to go forward with the initiative. Thailand and Philippines maintained bilateral defence treaties with the US while Singapore believed that its security was best served by a strong and unrestricted US military presence in the region.
3 Thus, the proposed nuclear weapon-free zone created a division within ASEAN ranks, with Indonesia and Malaysia remaining more enthusiastic about the proposal than the four other members (Brunei joined ASEAN in 1984) .
The end of the Cold War and the thaw in ASEAN-Vietnam relations following the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement on Cambodia in 1991 removed a major obstacle to the nuclear weapon-free zone proposal. ASEAN's decision in 1992 to begin dealing with regional security issues more directly and regularly (until then, the ASEAN members had stressed the grouping's socio-economic objectives while downplaying its role in regional security affairs) gave a new impetus to the proposed zone. Despite facing no danger of nuclear proliferation within the Southeast Asia region, ASEAN was concerned that North Korea's nuclear programme might encourage Japan to go nuclear. Another concern was China's expanding nuclear arsenal and its territorial claims in South China Sea, which involved it in disputes with four Southeast Asian countries (Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam and the Philippines). Against this backdrop, a nuclear weapon-free zone covering the land mass and extended maritime zones of Southeast Asia could be helpful in addressing ASEAN's long-term concerns regarding nuclear rivalry among major the powers of the Asia Pacific region.
At the 26th ASEAN ministerial meeting in Singapore in 1993, ASEAN Foreign Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to ZOPFAN. As an essential component of ZOPFAN, they decided to bring the nuclear weapon-free zone concept into realisation. These efforts culminated in the signing of the Bangkok Treaty in December 1995.
III. Analysis of Treaty Provisions
The provisions of the Bangkok Treaty may be analysed in terms of six key areas. The first concerns obligations it imposes on the signatories (Article 3). These include prohibitions against efforts to develop, manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over nuclear weapons, or station, transport, test or use such weapons. The signatories also undertake not to allow any other state to develop, manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over nuclear weapons, or station, test or use them in their territory. The Treaty prohibits dumping of radioactive substances on land, at sea or into the atmosphere.
A second area of the Treaty concerns the peaceful uses of nuclear energy (Articles 4 and 5). While the Treaty allows the use of nuclear energy for economic development, any such programme must be submitted for rigorous safety assessment before start. This assessment must be made available to other member states when requested. Signatories undertake to ensure the safe disposal of radioactive wastes. Prompt notification is required in the event of nuclear accidents.
A third area of the Treaty deals with the rights of passage (Articles 2 and 7). The Treaty does not prejudice the rights of states in this regard under the Law of the Sea, such as those concerning freedom of the high seas, rights of innocent passage, and transit of ships and aircraft. Each state may decide for itself whether to allow visits by foreign ships and aircraft to the ports and airfields of signatory states, transit of its airspace by foreign aircraft, navigation by foreign ships through its territorial sea or archipelagic waters, and overflight of foreign aircraft above those waters in a manner not governed by the rights of innocent passage, archipelagic sea-lane passage or transit passage.
A fourth area of the Treaty concerns implementation, compliance and verification mechanisms (Articles 5, ,10, 11, 12, and 13). The Treaty's verification regime relies on (1) the IAEA safeguards system, (2) mutual reporting and exchange of information among the parties to the Treaty, and (3) request for fact-finding missions by Treaty signatories. A Commission, consisting of the foreign ministers from each signatory state, will oversee implementation and ensure compliance. It should be noted that the Bangkok Treaty contains no provision for challenge inspections. Instead, it provides for allows loosely-defined fact-finding missions (see the Annex to the Treaty). Every member state has the right to ask for a fact-finding mission to be sent to another state to clarify and resolve doubts about compliance with the Treaty.
A fifth area is the provision of a dispute settlement mechanism. Disputes regarding interpretation of the Treaty should be settled by peaceful means, including negotiation, mediation, enquiry and conciliation. But if no settlement can be reached within one month, then the dispute may be referred to the International Court of Justice. Despite the availability of this legal mechanism, ASEAN officials have stressed the importance of political dialogue as a means of dispute settlement. Legal procedures are to be used only as a last resort.
Finally, like treaties creating nuclear weapon-free zones elsewhere, the Bangkok treaty contains a protocol which is open for signature by the five declared nuclear powers: China, France, Russia, Britain and the US. Under the terms of the protocol, the nuclear powers are to undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any state party to the Treaty. They are also to declare their intention to help achieve "general and complete disarmament of nuclear weapons." The protocol is to remain in force indefinitely, although a signatory to the protocol may withdraw on a 12-month notice.
IV. The Attitude of the Nuclear Powers
Currently, no Southeast Asia country possesses or is suspected of developing nuclear weapons. Therefore, the main purpose of a nuclear weapon-free zone in Southeast Asia is to regulate the policies of the five nuclear powers. But none of the latter agreed to sign the protocol despite ASEAN's last-minute offer of some amendments and revisions to the text of the Treaty before it was signed in Bangkok. 4 At that time, the nuclear powers complained of ASEAN's failure to adequately consult them prior to the signing of the Treaty, a charge which ASEAN rejected. But the more serious reasons behind their refusal to sign the protocol pertained to its language and specific provisions. In this regard, the two most distinctive features of the Bangkok Treaty have also proved to be the most controversial. These concern the zone's coverage of maritime areas and the restraints it seeks to place on the nuclear powers which the latter, particularly the US, consider to be too sweeping and restrictive.
5
In registering the strongest objection to the Treaty in its original form, the US argues that the Treaty implies territorial rights on the part of the signatories which it does not and cannot accept, and which may threaten its ability to move warships around the globe. The US particularly objects to the application of the Treaty's provisions to the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zones. In the US view, these provisions violate the Law of the Sea which while allowing the coastal nations to exercise sovereign rights over resources development in exclusive economic waters and continental shelves, does not permit them to exercise political control, such as the restrictions imposed by the Treaty on nuclear activity anywhere within the Treaty area. The US is also concerned that the Treaty's provisions concerning the rights of innocent passage of warships and aircraft are "too restrictive".
6
The Treaty leaves it unclear who interprets the right of innocent passage. Despite ASEAN's assurances that innocent passage of nuclear-armed or -powered vessels through Southeast Asia waters is allowed under the Treaty, the US fears that the Treaty restricts the free passage of warships, including submarines, equipped with strategic missiles and other nuclear weapons. Against this backdrop, American officials insist that the text of the Bangkok Treaty and its protocol to meet the US criteria for supporting nuclear weapons free such zones.
While China has indicated support for the general objectives of the Treaty, it too objects to the territorial scope of the Treaty. As a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, Mr Chen Jian, stated: "The issue at present is the geographical area of the zone. We have expressed our concern to Asean." 7 At the same time, China issued a reminder that it already had a long-standing policy of 4 Dacanay, A. "Nuclear-free zone, liberalization moves herald a deeper, broader ASEAN", The Nikkei Weekly, 18 Dec. 1995, p. 20. 5 Editorial, " Leap toward united, N-free S.E. Asia", The Daily Yomiuri, 16 Dec. 1995, p.11. 6 Johnson, C., "Southeast Asia asks world to back nuclear pact", Reuters World Service Dispatch, 15 Dec. 1995. 7 Lee S. H., "Study investment prospects, Asem told", The Straits Times (Singapore) 2 Mar. 1996, p.18. no-first-use of nuclear weapons, under which it is obliged not to "use...nuclear arms...against non-nuclear states or in nuclear-free zones". 8 The reasons behind the Chinese objection may be understood in the context of the Treaty's coverage of areas in the South China Sea which are under dispute between China and several of the Southeast Asian countries. Beijing's concerns are aggravated by the enthusiasm for the Treaty, shown by Vietnam, which alone among the ASEAN members has a history of direct military confrontation with China.
9
While visiting Singapore in early 1996, French President Jacques Chirac stated that his country was "predisposed to sign the Treaty".
10 But he conceded that some "technical details" (which he did not specify) remained to be sorted out.
11 By appearing to be less hardline on the Treaty than the US, Chirac was clearly trying to restore the country's image in the region which had taken a battering when it resumed nuclear testing in the South Pacific in 1995. It is noteworthy that while expressing France's "constructive attitude" towards the creation of a nuclear weapon-free zone in Southeast Asia, 12 Chirac also announced his decision to sign the protocol to the Rarotonga Treaty on the nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific, after France had completed, in January 1996, its sixth and last nuclear test in the South Pacific.
The Russian attitude toward the Bangkok Treaty has been somewhat more positive. 13 The Russian Ambassador to Indonesia expressed Russia's support for the Treaty "in principle". While Russia did not "want its contents changed", it "need[ed] clarification on how the treaty will be implemented." These include details of the boundaries covered by the Treaty and the regulations covering ships operating in the zone.
14 Despite its soft tone, however, Russia has not signed the protocol.
V. Propsects
The ASEAN countries have expressed great disappointment with the refusal of the nuclear powers to accept the Bangkok Treaty in its present form. 15 As Malaysian Foreign Ministry 8 Lee (note 7), p.18. 9 "Nuclear-free zones", Mainichi Daily News, 19 Dec. 1995, p.2. It may be recalled that China carried out a "punitive" attack on Vietnam in retaliation against the Latter's invasion of Cambodia in 1978 and had since fought two naval battles with China in the South China Sea.
10
"France likely to sign S-E Asia N-pact soon", The Straits Times (Singapore), 3 Mar. 1996, p.18. 11 Ganz, S., "France ready to sign on SE Asian nuclear-free zone", Kyodo News Service Dispatch, Japan Economic Newswire, 2 Mar. 1996. Secretary General Ahmed Kamil Jaafar put it, "If we succumb to their fancies, it will make nonsense of that treaty." 16 Vietnam's Prime Minister, Vo Van Kiet, urged the nuclear powers to "respect Southeast Asia's aspiration and commitment" by accepting the Treaty. 17 But realising that without the support of the nuclear powers, its hopes for a nuclear free zone will remain a pipe dream, ASEAN agreed to a dialogue with the US to accommodate its reservations. President Fidel Ramos of the Philippines stated that the treaty and protocol had enough "flexibility" to accommodate the big powers, adding, "ASEAN is going to be very patient about this".
18
The US has proposed two ways to resolve the protocol issue. 19 The first option is to delete all references to continental shelves and EEZs in the text of the Treaty. This is America's preferred option. A less desirable option from the American point of view is for all the parties to the Treaty to issue an "interpretive statement" which specifies that the Treaty's provisions concerning continental shelves and EEZs will apply only to the parties to the Treaty and not to the protocol signatories. This statement should be accompanied by the deletion of the second sentence of Article 2 of the protocol, which now reads as follows: "It [the signatory to the protocol] further undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons within the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone." In recent talks with ASEAN, the US has pointed out that this sentence prohibits it from launching nuclear missiles from platforms, such as ships or submarines, sailing within the zone against targets outside the zone. 20 The modified Article 2, in US view, should only read: "Each State Party undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any State Party to the Treaty."
Although both the US and ASEAN seem hopeful that mutually acceptable amendments to the Treaty will be found as a matter of course, several exchanges between them to resolve the difference over the protocol language have failed to produce the desired breakthrough. Coloma, R., "Big powers' doubts pose problems for Southeast Asia nuclear ban", Agence France Presse Dispatch, 16 Dec. 1996. 19 This information is derived from the author's personal conversation with Ambassador Thomas Graham, the US' special representative for arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament, in Kuala Lumpur on 8 June 1996. 20 According to a source familiar with the negotiations, Malaysia has proposed language that allows the nuclear powers to launch nuclear weapons from within the zone targeted against non-zonal states, but the US insists on deleting the above-mention sentence altogether.
21
For example, no progress was made in talks held in Kuala Lumpur during 2-4 June 1997 to consider a series of compromises to resolve the differences between the ASEAN members and the nuclear weapon states over the protocol language. Arms Control Reporter, Sept. 1997, p.459.B.4 concerns regarding the implications of the Treaty for its territorial claims in the South China Sea.
VI. Conclusion
Despite the problems it has encountered in securing agreement from the nuclear powers, the Bangkok Treaty remains an important milestone for ASEAN. It also strengthens the global non-proliferation regime by signalling the growing acceptance of nuclear weapon-free zones around the world. The Bangkok Treaty added momentum to regional approaches to nuclear non-proliferation, having just preceded the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in Africa and the ratification of the protocol to the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone by all five declared nuclear powers. Although non-proliferation problems in Asia are more salient in the Korean Peninsula and South Asia, a nuclear weapon-free zone in Southeast Asia sets an important precedent in dealing with proliferation issues in the wider Asia Pacific region. It is interesting to note that in the wake of the signing of the Bangkok Treaty, ASEAN sought to put pressure on India to forego nuclear testing. 22 A successful agreement between ASEAN and the nuclear powers on the protocol to the Treaty will be an important demonstration of the relevance of nuclear weapon-free zones and a helpful signal of the desire and commitment of the nuclear powers to halt proliferation trends in other areas of the Asia Pacific and the world.
22
"Southeast Asia opposes any Indian nuclear test", Reuters World Service Dispatch, 16 Dec. 1995. The Bangkok Treaty was signed at a time when speculation was rife concerning an imminent Indian nuclear test. Ajit Singh, the then Secretary General of ASEAN, stated ASEAN's opposition to nuclear testing by any power, including India. But when India joined the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a grouping of Asia Pacific countries to discuss regional security issues, in 1996, the ASEAN countries did not seem to put India on the spot on its refusal to accept the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty or to use the ARF to discuss South Asian proliferation issues.
